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More Efficient Privacy Amplification with Less
Random Seeds via Dual Universal Hash Function
Masahito Hayashi and Toyohiro Tsurumaru
Abstract
We explicitly construct random hash functions for privacy amplification (extractors) that require smaller random
seed lengths than the previous literature, and still allow efficient implementations with complexity O(n log n) for
input length n. The key idea is the concept of dual universal2 hash function introduced recently. We also use a new
method for constructing extractors by concatenating δ-almost dual universal2 hash functions with other extractors.
Besides minimizing seed lengths, we also introduce methods that allow one to use non-uniform random seeds
for extractors. These methods can be applied to a wide class of extractors, including dual universal2 hash function,
as well as to conventional universal2 hash functions.
Index Terms
privacy amplification, universal hash function, minimum entropy, quantum cryptography
I. INTRODUCTION
EVEN when a random source at hand is partially leaked to an eavesdropper, one can amplify itssecrecy by applying a random hash function. This process is called the privacy amplification. In
this process, the amplification of secrecy is realized with the help of another auxiliary random source,
which is public and is called a random seed. The random hash functions used for this purpose are often
called extractors. There is also a similar but distinct process called two-sources-extractors [10], where
the auxiliary random source is not public. The most typical random hash function for these purposes is
the universal2 hash function [6], [54]. There are many security theorems which assumes the use of the
universal2 hash function. In particular, the leftover hashing lemma [5], [16] has several extensions and
various applications in the classical and quantum setting [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [26], [31], [36], [47].
Privacy amplification has now become indispensable for guaranteeing the security of quantum key
distribution (QKD) [4], [24], [25], [36]. There are already many reports on its implementations [2], [32],
[38], as well as open software packages available [3], [32]. So far most practical extractors are known
to be universal2 hash function, and the most widely used among them is the (modified) Toeplitz matrix,
mainly because it can be implemented efficiently with complexity O(n logn) for input length n (see
Appendix C, or Refs. [38], [51]). Here we note that the usual notion of efficiency (i.e., the algorithm
finishes in polynomial time) is not sufficient, but a stricter criterion of the complexity being O(n logn)
is desirable for QKD. This is because, for typical QKD systems, the finite size effect requires the input
length n to be n ≥ 106 [24], [25], [48] , and thus algorithms that are efficient in the usual sense, e.g.,
O(n2), are useless (for details, see Appendix E).
Another important criterion for practical hash functions is how much randomness is required for the
random seed. This can be measured in two ways, i.e., by the required length of a uniformly random seed,
and also by the entropy of the seed. While the importance of minimizing the former is obvious, the latter
is also equally important, since it is quite difficult to prepare a perfect random number generator for real
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2cryptographic systems. Trevisan’s extractor is known to realize exceptionally good performance in terms
of these criteria [7], [50], but also has as a drawback that its computational complexity is larger than
O(n logn) of the Toeplitz case (for details, see [32] and Appendix E).
The main goal of this paper is to construct explicitly random hash functions for privacy amplification that
require smaller random seed lengths than in the previous literature, and still allow efficient implementations
with complexity O(n logn) for input length n. This is of course aimed at reducing the implementation cost
of physical random number generators (RNG), included in actual cryptographic systems. For achieving
this goal, we use the concept of δ-almost dual universal2 hash function. We also use a new method
for constructing extractors by concatenating δ-almost dual universal2 hash functions and conventional
extractors.
In addition to minimizing the seed lengths, we also present general methods that enable the use of
non-uniform random seeds. These methods are general in the sense that they can be applied a wide class
of extractors, including dual universal2 hash function, as well as to conventional universal2 hash functions.
The minimum entropy is used here as a measure that describes the randomness of the non-uniform random
seed. These methods are not just meant as a clever trick for reducing the implementation cost of random
number generators (RNGs), but rather a crucial technique for filling a gap between theory and practice
of privacy amplification; that is, while there is no RNG available that outputs perfectly random seeds in
practice, our methods can always be adopted in order to extract rigorously secure outputs from practical
privacy amplification modules using imperfect RNGs as the random seed. Particularly, in the context of
QKD, such non-uniformity of RNGs can be regarded as a new example of the imperfections of practical
systems, which are studied extensively recently (see, e.g., [44] and references therein), and our methods
are a serious countermeasure against it.
The concept of the δ-almost dual universal2 hash function, as well as the extended leftover hashing
lemma for it were proposed in Refs. [12], [51] (c.f. Remark 1, Section III-C). In [51], we also gave the
explicit inclusion relation with the (conventional) universal2 hash function; e.g., if an arbitrary linear and
surjective hash function is universal2 (with δ = 1), then it is automatically δ′-almost dual universal2, where
δ′ is another constant smaller than two. In this sense, the δ-almost dual universal2 function can be regarded
as an extension of the conventional universal2 function. Several classical and quantum security evaluations
have been obtained based on this new class of hash functions [18], [21]. In particular, finite-length security
analysis has been done with this class [24], [25].
This paper begins by reviewing properties of conventional and dual universal2 hash functions, the
corresponding security criteria, and the corresponding leftover hashing lemmas. Then we propose a new
method to construct random hash functions by concatenating given random hash functions. While a method
is already known for concatenating two (conventional) δ-almost universal2 hash functions [43], we are
here rather interested in other combinations including δ-almost dual universal2 hash functions. Then by
exploiting these results, we present secure hash functions that require less random seed length h than
previous methods, and can be implemented with complexity O(n logn). That is, we explicitly construct a
set of extractors whose seed lengths are min(m,n−m) asymptotically, where n is the input length and m
the output length. Recall that all existing random hash functions achieving O(n logn) complexity, such as
the one using the (modified) Toeplitz matrix and those of [49], require seed length n or 2m asymptotically
(see Table I). Hence the seed length is reduced in all paramter regions by using our construction. Note
that particularly when the compression rate α := m/n goes to one, the seed length goes to zero, meaning
that the improvement ratio goes to infinite.
Our construction consists of four types of hash functions. We first present fF1,R suitable for compression
rate α := m/n ≤ 1/2, and fF2,R suitable for any values of α, both requiring seed length n−m. Although
fF2,R covers a wider range of α than fF1,R, we introduce fF1,R because it has its own merits in its region
(c.f. Section V-B, Remark 3). Then by concatenating fF2,R and its dual f⊥F2,R, we construct fF3,R and
fF4,R which require seed length m asymptotically.
In order to demonstrate that hash functions fF1,R, . . . , fF4,R can indeed be implemented efficiently
with complexity O(n logn), we also give a set of explicit algorithms in Appendix D. This algorithm
3TABLE I
COMPARISON OF RANDOM HASH FUNCTIONS
computational complexity
length of random seeds h & min entropy t
when the seeds are uniformly random (Section VI)
ǫ const. ǫ = e−βn
γ
Our hash functions fF1,R and fF2,R O(n log n)
t = αn+O(1) t = αn+ 2βnγ +O(1)
h = (1− α)n h = (1− α)n
Our hash functions fF3,R O(n log n)
t = αn+O(1) t = αn+ 2βnγ +O(1)
h = αn+O(1) h = αn+ 4βnγ +O(1)
Our hash functions fF4,R O(n log n) t = αn+O(1) t = αn+ 4βn
γ +O(1)
h = αn+O(1) h = αn+ 4βnγ +O(1)
Hash functions using Toeplitz matrix O(n log n) t = αn+O(1) t = αn+ 2βn
γ +O(1)
h = n h = n
Trevisan’s extractor [7], [32], [50] poly(n) t = αn+O(1) t = αn+ 4βn
γ +O(1)
h = O(log3 n) h = O(n2γ log n)
Hash functions in the TSSR paper [49] O(n log n)∗ t = αn+O(1) t = αn+ 4βn
γ +O(1)
h = 2αn+O(1) h = 2αn+ 4βnγ +O(1)
ǫ-almost pairwise independent hash function [33] poly(n) t = αn+O(1) t = αn+ 4βn
γ +O(1)
h = 4αn+ o(n) h = 4αn+ 4βnγ + o(n)
Strong blender (classical) [9] poly(n) t = αn+O(1) t = αn+ 2βn
γ +O(1)
h = n h = n
Parameter n is the length of the input to the hash function, and ǫ is the security level (L1 distinguishability) of the final key. Parameters
h, t, α, γ are defined in order to compare the six schemes for a case where the random seeds are uniformly random: t is the required
minimum entropy for the input to a hash function, αn the output length, h the required length of random seeds, and γ a constant in (0, 1].
We mainly choose γ > 1/2. fF3,R is a hash function for the classical case. fF4,R is its quantum modification. ∗The paper [49] did not
evaluate the computational complexity. However, when we employ our construction of finite filed given in Appendix D, we find that the
computational complexity of the random hash function is O(n log n).
set uses multiplication algorithm for finite field F2k developed, e.g., in Refs. [30], [41], and works for
parameter k satisfying certain conditions related to Artin’s conjecture [42, Chap. 21]. We numerically
check the existence of so many such integers up to k ≃ 1050, and thus the algorithm can be applied to
most practical cases. It should also be noted that there is another similarly useful algorithm for finite field
arithmetic presented in Section 7.3.1 of [52], which, together with our algorithm, allows one to implement
a wider class of finite fields efficiently.
As to comparisons with the existing methods: Trevisan [50] proposed another random hash function,
whose security in the quantum case was studied by [7], and software performance in [32]. Papers [33],
[49] also proposed other random hash functions. As is also summarized in Table I, the relations with our
hash function are as follows.
1) Our random hash functions, fF1,R, . . . , fF4,R and those of Ref. [49] have an efficient algorithm with
complexity O(n logn) for input length n. On the other hand, Ref. [9] only considers algorithms
typically with complexity O(n3), and Ref. [33] with poly(n). For Trevisan’s random extractor, the
complexity of the actual calculation (besides pre-computations) is only shown to be polynomial
in n, and indeed large in practice as demonstrated in [32] (also, see Appendix E). Although our
random hash functions require a search for an integer k mentioned above, it should be noted that
k of a desired size up to k ≃ 1050 can be found in less than a second, and thus our random hash
functions practically have no pre-computation.
2) For the case where the uniform random seeds are uniformly random, we also compare the required
length h of random seeds, and the required minimum entropy t of the input to the hash function,
as is summarized in Table I. Here we denote the input and output lengths by n and m, their ratio
by α := m/n, and the security level (L1 distinguishability) of the final key by ǫ.
• When both α and ǫ are constant, all random hash functions have almost the same required
minimum input entropy t. While Trevisan’s random extractor [7], [50] has the minimum value
for the required length h of random seeds, the computational complexity is O(poly(n)) and
4also requires a pre-computation. Our hash function fF1,R, fF2,R or fF3,R, fF4,R realizes the next
minimum value dependently of α, and can be implemented efficiently with O(n logn) and with
virtually no pre-computation.
• Next, we consider the case where α is constant and ǫ is exponentially small with respect to n;
that is, we assume that ǫ behaves as e−βnγ with γ > 1
2
.
1 In this case our random hash function
fF1,R, fF2,R or fF3,R, fF4,R achieves the minimum values of the required length h of random
seeds and the required minimum input entropy t at least in the first order n, dependently of α.
(See Section VI-D for comparison in other regions).
This paper covers the security against quantum leaked information as well as non-quantum (i.e.,
classical) leaked information. However, it should be noted that this paper is organized so that it can
be understood without quantum knowledges. Discussions with quantum terminologies are given only in
Subsection III-D. The term “quantum” appearing in other parts of the paper can be replaced by “classical,”
if the reader is interested only in the non-quantum case.
The rest of this paper is organized as as follows. In Section II, we introduce the conventional universal2
functions, as well as the δ-almost dual universal2 functions, and in Section III, we present known results
on their security. In Section IV, we propose a new method for constructing new random hash functions by
concatenating given random hash functions. Section V introduces our new random hash functions fF1,R,
. . . , fF4,R, and show their security using the δ-almost dual universality2. In Section VI, we compare these
hash functions with the existing ones, i.e., Trevisan’s random extractor [7], [50] and hash functions of
[33], [49]. In Section VII, we present general methods that allows one to use non-uniform random seeds.
Appendices are mostly concerned with efficient algorithms for implementing hash functions, and the proof
of a lemma.
II. δ-ALMOST DUAL UNIVERSAL2 FUNCTION
A. δ-almost universal2 function
We start by recalling basic properties of universal2 hash functions. Consider sets A and B, and also a
set F of functions from A to B; that is, F = {fr|r ∈ R} with fr : A → B, where R denotes a set of
indices r of hash functions. We always assume |A| ≥ |B| ≥ 2, so that the output can be used as a hashing
or a digest of an input message. By selecting fr randomly, we can realize a random hash function with
a sufficiently small collision probability.
In the preceding literatures, a set F is usually called function family and it is assumed that fr are chosen
with the equal probability. In this paper, however, the index r may be chosen as the random variable R
subject to the distribution PR(r). Then, we consider a random hash function fR and call it a random
(hash) function. The random variable R is called random seeds, and, in particular, is called the uniform
random seeds when the distribution PR(r) is the uniform distribution. We call the number of bits of the
random variable the length of the random seeds.
We say that a random hash function fR is δ-almost universal2 [6], [54], [51], if, for any pair of different
inputs x1,x2, the collision probability of their outputs is upper bounded as
Pr [fR(x1) = fR(x2)] ≤ δ|B| . (1)
In this paper, Pr [fR(x1) = fR(x2)] denotes the probability that the random variable R satisfies the
condition fR(x1) = fR(x2), and the probability Pr[R = r] is simplified to PR(r).
Also throughout the paper, we consider a surjective linear hash function fR : Fn2 → Fm2 , labeled by
a random variable R. That is, the sets A and B are chosen to be Fn2 and Fm2 . Then the definition of
δ-universal2 function, given in (1), can be simplified as
∀x ∈ Fn2 \ {0}, Pr [x ∈ KerfR] ≤ 2−mδ. (2)
1Recall that, as is numerically shown in [53], when ǫ is too small in comparison with n, it is better to describe ǫ as an exponential function
of n.
5B. Dual pair of hash functions
Any surjective linear function fr can be represented using a full-rank matrix G as
b = fr(a) := aG
T
r (3)
with a ∈ {0, 1}n, b ∈ {0, 1}m. Since we are working in the finite field F2, we always assume modulo 2
in calculation of matrices and vectors. Further, with a suitable choice of the basis, we can chose Gr to
be a concatenation of the identity matrix Im of degree m, and some m× (n−m) matrix:
Gr := (Im|Ar) . (4)
By noting that Gr is similar to a generating matrix of a systematic code, we are naturally led to consider
the corresponding check matrix Hr, defined as
Hr :=
(
ATr |In−m
)
, (5)
as well as the corresponding linear function f⊥r : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n−m, defined by
c = f⊥r (a) := aH
T
r (6)
with a ∈ {0, 1}n, b ∈ {0, 1}n−m.
C. δ-almost dual universal2 function
With this correspondence, we can also define the dual of a random hash function fR. That is, given a
random hash function fR, its dual random hash function is f⊥R .
It is natural to extend this universality to the dual of the random hash function. That is, we call a
random function fR is δ-almost dual universal2, whenever its dual f⊥R is δ-almost universal2 [51]. More
formally,
Definition 1: If a surjective random hash function fR from Fn2 to Fm2 satisfies the condition
∀x ∈ Fn2 \ {0}, Pr[x ∈ (KerfR)⊥] ≤ δ2−(n−m), (7)
then we say that fR is δ-almost dual universal2.
III. SECURITY OF PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION
A. Notations
In order to discuss the security problem, we prepare several information quantities for a joint distribution
PA,E on the sets A and E , and another distribution QE on E . The conditional Re´nyi entropy of order 2
(the collision entropy), and the conditional min entropy are given as [36]
H2(A|E|PA,E‖QE) :=− log
∑
e
QE(e)
∑
a
(
PA,E(a, e)
QE(e)
)2,
Hmin(A|E|PA,E‖QE)
:=− logmax
a,e
PA,E(a, e)
QE(e)
, (8)
Hmin(A|E|PA,E) :=max
QE
Hmin(A|E|PA,E‖QE).
Also, we employ
D2(PE‖QE) := log
∑
e
PE(e)
2QE(e)
−1.
6Since
∑
a PA|E(a|e)2 ≤ maxa PA|E(a|e), we have
H2(A|E|PA,E‖QE) ≥ Hmin(A|E|PA,E‖QE). (9)
In particular, when we have only one random variable A, these quantities are written as H2(A|PA) and
Hmin(A|PA). Further, the maximum in (8) can be realized when QE(e) = c−1maxa PA,E(a, e) with the
normalizing constant c :=
∑
emaxa PA,E(a, e) =
∑
e PE(e)maxa
PA,E(a,e)
PE(e)
. Since Hmin(A|E|PA,E) =
− log c, we have [46, Section 4.3.1] [28]
Hmin(A|E|PA,E) = − log
∑
e
PE(e)max
a
PA,E(a, e)
PE(e)
,
which implies that
Hmin(A|E|PA,E) ≤ H2(A|E|PA,E‖PE). (10)
B. Security criterion for random number
Next, we introduce criteria for the amount of the information leaked from Alice’s secret random number
A to Eve’s random variable E for joint sub-distribution PA,E. Using the L1 norm, we can evaluate the
secrecy for the state PA,E as follows:
d1(A|E|PA,E) := ‖PA,E − PA × PE‖1. (11)
That is, the secrecy is measured by the difference between the true sub-distribution PA,E and the ideal
sub-distribution PA × PE.
In order to take the randomness of A into account, Renner [36] also defines another type of the L1
distinguishability criteria for security of the secret random number A:
d′1(A|E|PA,E) := ‖PA,E − PU,A × PE‖1, (12)
where PU,A is the uniform distribution with respect to the random variable A. This quantity can be regarded
as the difference between the true sub-distribution PA,E and the ideal distribution PU,A×PE . It is known
that this security criterion is universally composable [37]. To evaluate d′1(A|E|PA,E), we often use
d2(A|E|PA,E‖QE)
:=
∑
a,e
(PA,E(a, e)− PU,A(a)PE(e))2QE(e)−1
=2−H2(A|E|PA,E‖QE) − 2
D2(PE‖QE)
|A| , (13)
which upper bounds d′1(A|E|PA,E) as
d′1(A|E|PA,E) ≤ d2(A|E|PA,E‖QE)
1
2 |A| 12 . (14)
Using the above quantity, we give the following definition for a random hash function fR.
Definition 2: A random hash function fR from Fn2 to Fm2 is called a (t, ǫ)-classical strong extractor if
any distribution PA with the minimum entropy Hmin(A) ≥ t satisfies
ER‖PfR(A) − PUm‖1 ≤ ǫ, (15)
where PUm is the uniform distribution on Fm2 .
Indeed, the above condition is equivalent with the following condition for a random hash function fR.
A distribution PA,E satisfies
ERd
′
1(fR(A)|E|PA,E) ≤ ǫ. (16)
when Hmin(A|E|PA,E) ≥ t.
7C. Performance of δ-almost (dual) universal hash function
It has been known for a very long period that universality2 (with δ = 1) is relevant for leftover hashing.
Tomamichel et al. [49, Lemma 1] showed that the leftover hashing lemma can be extended to δ-almost
universal2 hash function [43], [45] (with general values of δ) as follows.
Lemma 1: Given a joint distribution PA,E on A × E , and a δ-almost universal2 hash function fR, we
have
ERd2(fR(A)|E|PA,E‖QE)
≤(δ − 1)2−m+D2(PE‖QE) + 2−H2(A|E|PA,E‖QE). (17)
By substituting PE into QE , and by using (10), (14), the inequality H2(A|E|PA,E‖QE) ≥ Hmin(A|E|PA,E‖QE),
and Jensen’s inequality, we obtain
ERd
′
1(fR(A)|E|PA,E) ≤
√
δ − 1 + 2m−Hmin(A|E|PA,E). (18)
For readers’ convenience, we give a proof of (17) in Appendix H. Lemma 1 guarantees that any δ-almost
universal2 hash function from Fn2 to Fm2 is a (t,
√
δ − 1 + 2m−t)-classical strong extractor.
On the other hand, in our paper [51], we have shown that the dual universality is indeed a generalization
of universality2. That is, it has been shown in the paper [51] that the universality2 implies the δ-almost
dual universality2:
Corollary 1: If a surjective random function fR : Fn2 → Fm2 is δ-almost universal2, then its dual random
function gR : Fn2 → Fn−m2 is 2(1− 2−mδ) + (δ − 1)2n−m-almost universal2.
Further, as mentioned in Remark 1, it is known that an application of a δ-almost dual universal2
surjective hash function guarantees the security in the following way.
Lemma 2: Given a joint distribution PA,E on A × E , a distribution QE on E , and a δ-almost dual
universal2 surjective hash function fR, we have
ERd2(fR(A)|E|PA,E‖QE)
≤ δd2(A|E|PA,E‖QE)
≤ δ2−H2(A|E|PA,E‖QE). (19)
By using (14) and Jensen’s inequality, we obtain
ERd
′
1(fR(A)|E|PA,E) ≤
√
δ2
m−H2(A|E|PA,E‖QE)
2
≤
√
δ2
m−Hmin(A|E|PA,E‖QE )
2 . (20)
That is,
ERd
′
1(fR(A)|E|PA,E) ≤
√
δ2
m−Hmin(A|E|PA,E)
2 . (21)
While Lemma 2 is originally shown in [51] in the quantum setting, its proof with the non-quantum setting
is also given in [21].
The advantage of δ-almost dual universality2 is that, due to Lemma 2, it can guarantees secrecy even
with δ ≥ 2 as long as m is sufficiently small in comparison with Hmin(A|E|PA,E). Note that it is not
possible with the (conventional) δ-almost universality2 due to Lemma 1, and also due to a counterexample
given in Section VIII.B of [51]. Lemma 2 states that any δ-almost dual universal2 surjective random hash
function from Fn2 to Fm2 is a (t,
√
δ2
m−t
2 )-classical strong extractor. As we will show in later sections, this
advantage allows us to design extractors which can guarantee the security with non-uniform random seeds.
This point will be featured more concretely in the case of the modified Toeplitz matrix in Subsection B-B
and in the case of our new hash function in Section V.
Remark 1: Lemma 2 is attributed to Fehr and Schaffner [12, Corollary 6.2], who proved it in terms of
the “δ-biasedness” in the quantum setting. We also note that our method of privacy amplification using
8the dual universal2 hash function [51] is essentially the same as the technique proposed in Ref. [12] using
the concept of the δ-biasedness. However, since no specific name was proposed for the hash function
used in Ref. [12], and also because we were interested in analyzing what hash function can guarantee the
security of the final keys, we proposed to call it the dual universal2 function in [51].
We believe that this short terminology describes the property of hash functions more directly than always
having to make reference to the δ-biasedness. Indeed, the δ-biasedness is not a concept for families of
hash functions, but for families of random variables or of linear codes (see, e.g., [11, Case 2]). Hence in
order to interpret it in the context of a hash function, one is always required to define the corresponding
linear code, as well as the explicit form of its generating matrix. On the other hand, these explicit forms
are not necessary in defining the δ-almost dual universality2, and thus it allows us to treat hash functions
more easily. For these reasons, the paper [51] introduced the concept “δ-almost dual universal2” as a
generalization of a linear universal2 hash function, and gave Lemma 2 based on the concept “δ-almost
dual universal2”.
Finally, we consider how much randomness is required for achieving the δ-almost dual universality2.
For the question, we have the following new relation between the parameter δ and the minimum entropy
Hmin(R).
Lemma 3: An δ-almost dual universal2 surjective random hash function fR from Fn2 to Fm2 satisfies
Hmin(R) ≥ n−m− log δ. (22)
In the Subsection V-A, we give an example to attain the lower bound given in (22) with n = 2m.
Proof: First, we fix an arbitrary hash function fr. Then, there exists a non-zero element x ∈ Fn2 such
that f⊥r (x) = 0. Due to the assumption,
Pr[R = r] ≤ Pr[f⊥R (x) = 0] ≤
δ
2n−m
. (23)
Since this argument holds for an arbitrary r ∈ R, we obtain (22).
D. Quantum extension
The contents of the previous sections can be generalized to the quantum case. When given a state ρA,E
in the composite system HA⊗HE and a state σE in the system HE, Renner [36] defined the conditional
Re´nyi entropy of order 2 (the collision entropy) and the conditional minimum entropy as
H2(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) := − log Tr σ−
1
2
E ρA,Eσ
− 1
2
E ρA,E (24)
Hmin(A|E|ρA,E‖σE)
:= − log ‖(IA ⊗ σE)− 12ρA,E(IA ⊗ σE)− 12‖ (25)
Hmin(A|E|ρA,E) := max
σE
Hmin(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) (26)
D2(ρE‖σE) := log Tr
(
(σ
−1/4
E ρEσ
−1/4
E )
2
)
. (27)
Since ‖(IA ⊗ σE)− 12ρA,E(IA ⊗ σE)− 12‖ ≥ Tr σ−
1
2
E ρA,Eσ
− 1
2
E ρA,E , we have
H2(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) ≥ Hmin(A|E|ρA,E‖σE). (28)
Renner (and others) also introduced the L1 distinguishability criteria for security of the secret random
number A:
d′1(A|E|ρA,E) := ‖ρA,E − ρmix,A ⊗ ρE‖1, (29)
9where ρmix,A is the completely mixed state. This quantity can be regarded as the difference between the
true state ρA,E and the ideal state ρmix,A ⊗ ρE . It is known that the security criteria with respect to this
quantity is universally composable [37]. He also considered
d2(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) := Tr (σ−
1
4
E (ρA,E − ρmix,A ⊗ ρE)σ
− 1
4
E )
2
= 2−H2(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) − 2
D2(ρE‖σE)
|A| ,
which upper bounds d′1(A|E|ρA,E) as
d′1(A|E|ρA,E) ≤ d2(A|E|ρA,E‖σE)
1
2 |A| 12 . (30)
The concept of (t, ǫ)-classical strong extractor can be generalized as follows.
Definition 3: A random hash function fR from Fn2 to Fm2 is called a (t, ǫ)-quantum strong extractor
when the following condition holds. A classical-quantum state ρA,E satisfies
ER‖ρfR(A),E − PUm ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ ǫ (31)
when there exists a state σE on HE such that Hmin(A|E|ρA,E‖σE) ≥ t.
Remark 2: Since the classical case of the previous subsection is a special case this quantum extension,
any quantum strong extractor also works as a classical strong extractor with the same parameter. Thus, if
the reader is interested only in the classical case, he/she can always replace “quantum” strong extractor
with “classical” strong extractor. Similarly, a “classical (quantum) extractor,” appearing sometimes in what
follows, may be interpreted either as a quantum or a classical extractor according to one’s purpose.
As a generalization of Lemma 1, the paper [49] shows the following lemma.
Lemma 4: Given a joint state ρA,E on HA ⊗HE , and a δ-almost universal2 hash function fR, we have
ERd2(fR(A)|E|ρA,E‖σE)
≤(δ − 1)2−m+D2(ρE‖σE) + 2−H2(A|E|ρA,E‖σE). (32)
Since (32) is slightly stronger than [49, Lemma 5], we give a proof in Appendix H.
Lemma 5: [49, Lemma 3] Given a joint state ρA,E on HA ⊗HE and an arbitrary real number η > 0,
there exists a joint state ρ¯A,E on HA ⊗HE such that 12‖ρ¯A,E − ρA,E‖1 ≤ η and
2−H2(A|E|ρ¯A,E‖ρ¯E) ≤
(
2
η2
+ 1
)
2−Hmin(A|E|ρA,E). (33)
Combining (30) and Lemmas 4 and 5, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 6: Given a joint state ρA,E on HA ⊗HE , and a δ-almost universal2 hash function fR, we have
ERd
′
1(fR(A)|E|ρA,E)
≤min
η>0
2η +
√
δ − 1 + (1 + 2
η2
)2m−Hmin(A|E|ρA,E). (34)
As shown in [51] via the concept of δ-biased [11], [12], the following lemma [51] holds as a general-
ization of Lemma 2.
Lemma 7: Given a state ρA,E on HA⊗HE , a state σE on HE , and a δ-almost dual universal2 surjective
random hash function fR, we have
ERd2(fR(A)|E|ρA,E‖σE)
≤δd2(A|E|ρA,E‖σE)
≤δ2−H2(A|E|ρA,E‖σE). (35)
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By using (30) and Jensen’s inequality, we obtain
ERd
′
1(fR(A)|E|ρA,E) ≤
√
δ2
m−H2(A|E|ρA,E‖σE)
2
≤
√
δ2
m−Hmin(A|E|ρA,E‖σE)
2 . (36)
That is,
ERd
′
1(fR(A)|E|ρA,E) ≤
√
δ2
m−Hmin(A|E|ρA,E)
2 . (37)
That is, any δ-almost dual universal2 surjective random hash function from Fn2 to Fm2 is a (t,
√
δ2
m−t
2 )-
quantum strong extractor.
Lemma 6 is worse than that of the classical case, i.e., Lemma 1. Thus, in what follows, when comparing
the δ-almost dual universality2 and the δ-almost (conventional) universality2, we employ the security
evaluation given by Lemma 1 for characterizing the δ-almost universality2.
IV. CONCATENATION OF RANDOM HASH FUNCTIONS
We propose a new method to construct new random hash functions by concatenating given random hash
functions. While a method is already known for concatenating two (conventional) δ-almost universal2 hash
functions [43], we are here rather interested in other combinations including δ-almost dual universal2 hash
functions.
A. Concatenating a (conventional) universal2 hash function and a dual universal2 hash function
First, we consider concatenation of a conventional universal2 hash function with a dual universal2 hash
function. In this case, we have the following lemma for the collision probability d2.
Lemma 8: Given a δ-almost (conventional) universal2 hash function fR : F2n → F2l (satisfying δ ≥ 1)
and a δ′-almost dual universal2 hash function gS : F2l → F2m, the random hash function hRS := gS ◦ fR :
F2
n → F2m satisfies
ERS d2 (hRS(X)|E|PA,E‖QE)
≤δ′ (2−H2(X|E|PA,E‖QE) + (δ − 1)2D2(PE‖QE)−l) . (38)
in the classical case. Also for the quantum case, we have
ERS d2 (hRS(X)|E|ρA,E‖σE)
≤δ′ (2−H2(X|E|ρA,E |σE) + (δ − 1)2D2(ρE‖σE)−l) . (39)
Proof: For the sake of simplicity, we prove only the classical case. The quantum case can be shown
in the same way. We denote X = F2n, Y = F2l, Z = F2m, and fR : X → Y , gS : Y → Z. Lemma 7
yields that
ERS d2 (hRS(X)|E|PA,E‖QE)
= ER (ES d2 (gS(Y )|E|PA,E‖QE))
≤ ER δ′d2(Y |E|PA,E‖QE) (40)
Next, (17) in Lemma 1 implies that
ER d2(fR(X)|E|PA,E‖QE)
≤ 2−H2(X|E|PA,E‖QE) + (δ − 1)|Y|−12D2(PE‖QE). (41)
Combining (40) and (41), we have
ERS d2 (hRS(X)|E|PA,E‖QE)
≤δ′ (2−H2(X|E|PA,E‖QE) + (δ − 1)|Y|−12D2(PA,E‖QE)) . (42)
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The quantum case (39) can be shown in the same way.
Then by substituting PE into QE in Lemma 8 and by using (10), (14) and Jensen’s inequality, we can
show that hRS is a classical strong extractor.
Theorem 1: Given a δ-almost (conventional) universal2 hash function fR : F2n → F2l (satisfying
δ ≥ 1), a δ′-almost dual universal2 hash function gS : F2l → F2m, and η > 0, the random hash function
hRS := gS ◦ fR : F2n → F2m is a (t, ǫh)-classical extractor with
ǫh :=
√
δ′
√
2m−t + 2m−l(δ − 1). (43)
Similarly, we can also show that hRS is a quantum strong extractor.
Theorem 2: Given a δ-almost (conventional) universal2 hash function fR : F2n → F2l (satisfying
δ ≥ 1), a δ′-almost dual universal2 hash function gS : F2l → F2m, and η > 0, the random hash function
hRS := gS ◦ fR : F2n → F2m is a (t, ǫh)-quantum extractor with
ǫh :=
√
δ′
√
(2η−2 + 1) 2m−t + 2m−l(δ − 1)(1 + η) + 2η. (44)
Proof: In (39), we set σE = ρE . Then,
ERS d2 (hRS(X)|E|ρA,E‖ρE) (45)
≤ δ′ (2−H2(X|E|ρA,E |ρE) + 2−l(δ − 1)) .
By using (24) of [51],
ERS d1 (hRS(X)|E|ρAE)
≤
√
δ′
√
2m−H2(X|E|ρA,E |ρE) + 2m−l(δ − 1). (46)
Applying Lemma 5 to an arbitrary ρAE and ρ > 0, there exists a joint state ρ¯AE such that 12‖ρ¯A,E−ρA,E‖1 ≤
η and
2−H2(X|E|ρ¯A,E |ρ¯E) ≤ (2η−2 + 1) 2−Hmin(X|E|ρA,E). (47)
Since d1 (hRS(X)|E|ρAE) ≤ d1 (hRS(X)|E|ρAE) + 2η, we have
ERS d1 (hRS(X)|E|ρAE)
≤ERS d1 (hRS(X)|E|ρ¯AE) + 2η
≤
√
δ′
√
2m−H2(X|E|ρ¯A,E |ρ¯E) + 2m−l(δ − 1)(1 + η) + 2η
≤
√
δ′
√
(2η−2 + 1) 2m−Hmin(A|E|ρAE) + 2m−l(δ − 1)(1 + η)
+ 2η. (48)
The advantage of attaching a dual universal2 function to a conventional one is the following. When we
use a conventional universal2 hash function alone, the factor δ − 1 directly appears in an upper bound
of the security parameter (e.g., (18) of Lemma 1), and thus the security cannot be guaranteed for δ > 2
(also see a counterexample given in Section VIII.B of [51]). On the other hand, the above theorems
state that, when it is followed by a dual universal2 function, the factor δ − 1 becomes multiplied by the
coefficient 2m−l or 2m−l(1 + η), which can be chosen to approach zero. In a sense, the above theorems
can be interpreted as a method for converting a conventional δ-almost universal2 hash function into a
secure extractor, by concatenating it with a dual universal hash function.
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B. Concatenating two dual universal2 hash functions
For a concatenation of two dual universal hash functions, the collision probability d2 is bounded as
follows.
Lemma 9: Given a δ-almost dual universal2 hash function fR : F2n → F2l (satisfying δ ≥ 1) and a
δ′-almost dual universal2 hash function gS : F2l → F2m, the random hash function hRS := gS ◦fR : F2n →
F2
m satisfies
ERS d2 (hRS(X)|E|PA,E‖QE)
≤δ′δ (2−H2(X|E|PA,E‖QE) − 2D2(PA,E‖QE)−m)
≤δ′δ2−H2(X|E|PA,E‖QE). (49)
in the classical case. In the quantum case, we have
ERS d2 (hRS(X)|E|ρA,E‖σE)
≤δ′δ (2−H2(X|E|ρA,E |σE) − 2D2(ρE‖σE)−m)
≤δ′δ2−H2(X|E|ρA,E |σE). (50)
Proof: For the sake of simplicity, we prove only the classical case. The quantum case can be shown
in the same way. Lemma 2 yields that
ERS d2 (hRS(X)|E|PA,E‖QE)
= ER (ES d2 (gS(fR(X))|E|PA,E‖QE))
≤ ER δ′d2(fR(X)|E|PA,E‖QE)
≤ δ′δd2(X|E|PA,E‖QE). (51)
Using the relation d2(X|E|PA,E‖QE) = 2−H2(X|E|PA,E‖QE) − |Z|−12D2(PE‖QE), we obtain the desired
argument.
Then by applying (14) and Lemma 9, we can show that hRS is a classical (quantum) strong extractor.
Theorem 3: Given a δ-almost dual universal2 hash function fR : F2n → F2l (satisfying δ ≥ 1), a
δ′-almost dual universal2 hash function gS : F2l → F2m, and a real parameter η > 0, a random hash
function hRS := gS ◦ fR : F2n → F2m is a (t,
√
δ′δ2
m−t
2 )-classical (quantum) extractor.
C. Other combinations
We may consider a conventional universal2 hash function and a dual universal hash function, concate-
nated in the order opposite to Lemma 8. In this case, however, the factor δ − 1 directly appears in the
upper bound of ERSd1 (hRS(X)|E|PA,E), which makes it useless for δ ≥ 2.
Further, we can also consider a concatenation of two (conventional) almost universal2 hash functions
fR and gS . As shown in [43], fR ◦gS is also an almost universal2 hash function. We can also obtain upper
bounds on d1 for this case too by modifying the above theorems, but the results are the same as those
obtained by applying Lemma 1 to fR ◦ gS .
V. RANDOM HASH FUNCTIONS WITH SHORTER SEEDS
Many of existing random hash functions, such as the one using the Toeplitz matrix (see Appendix B)
and finite fields [43], require random seed R of the same length as the input length. The strong blender
by [9] also shares this drawback although it allows a non-uniform seed. The TSSR paper [49] succeeded
in reducing the seed length to 2m asymptotically. Trevisan’s extractor requires even a smaller seed length
of O(log3 n), but it requires a heavier computational complexity O(poly(n)) than O(n logn) common to
other methods (see Table I).
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In this section, by exploiting dual universality2 of hash functions, we will shorten the seed length to
min(m,n − m) asymptotically. For this purpose we present four types of random hash functions. First
we present fF1,R suitable for α = m/n ≤ 1/2, and fF2,R, both requiring seed length n − m. Then by
concatenating fF2,R and its dual f⊥F2,R, we construct fF3,R and fF4,R which require seed length m.
We note that fF1,R, . . . , fF4,R can all be implemented efficiently with complexity O(n logn). A set of
example algorithms using techniques of Refs. [41], [30] is given in Appendix D.
A. Random hash function fF1,R
We begin by presenting a hash function, fF1,R, which is suitable for compression rate α = m/n ≤ 1/2
and requires random seed length n−m.
1) Definitions:
Definition 4: A random hash function fF1,R : Fl2m → F2m is indexed by the uniform random variable
R = (R1, . . . , Rl−1) taking values in (F2m)l−1, and fr are defined as
fF1,r : (x1, . . . , xl) 7→ r1x1 + · · ·+ rl−1xl−1 + xl. (52)
It is easy to see that this random hash function indeed fits in our setting using generating and parity check
matrices. Consider a matrix representation M of a finite field F2m over F2, then fr can be rewritten as
linear functions over F2. The corresponding generating matrix can be chosen as G(r) = (A(r)|Im) with
A(r) defined as
A(r) = (M(r1),M(r2), . . . ,M(rl−1)) , (53)
where M(ri) are m×m matrices representing ri ∈ F2m (see, Appendix A). Therefore, the required amount
of random seeds is (l − 1)m bits. When we implement the modified Toeplitz matrix with the same size,
we need lm− 1 bits. When l = 2, the random hash function fF1,R requires the half random seeds of the
random seeds required by the modified Toeplitz matrix.
Lemma 10: The dual function f⊥F1,r : Fl2m → Fl−12m of fF1,r satisfies
f⊥F1,r : (x1, . . . , xl) 7→ (y1, . . . , yl−1), (54)
where
yi = xi + rixl. (55)
Proof: The corresponding parity check matrix can be defined as H(r) = (In−m|A(r)T). Then by
recalling that transpose matrices M(ri)T , contained in A(r)T , are also representations of F2m , we see that
the dual functions f⊥r takes the form stated in the lemma.
2) (Dual) universality:
Theorem 4: If random variables Ri are i.i.d. subject to the random variable R0 on Fm2 , then fF1,R is
universal2, and simultaneously, 1-almost dual universal2.
Proof: First we prove the universality2. Our goal is to bound the probability Pr [fF1,R(x) = 0] for
x 6= 0. If x1, . . . , xl−1 are all zero, then xl must be nonzero, and thus Pr [fF1,R(x) = 0] = 0. Next, if some
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of x1, . . . , xl−1 are nonzero, let xi be the leftmost nonzero element, then we see that
Pr [fF1,R(x) = 0]
≤ Pr
[
Rixi =
l−1∑
j=i+1
Rjxj + xl
]
=
∑
ri+1,...,rl−1
PRi+1,...,Rl−1(ri+1, . . . , rl−1)
·Pr
[
Ri = x
−1
i
(
l−1∑
j=i+1
rjxj + xl
)]
≤
∑
ri+1,...,rl−1
PRi+1,...,Rl−1(ri+1, . . . , rl−1)2
−m
= 2−m. (56)
The δ-almost dual universality2 can also be shown similarly. Again, it is easy to see that Pr
[
f⊥F1,R(x) = 0
]
=
0 if xl = 0, so we will restrict ourselves to the case of xl 6= 0. Then we have
Pr
[
f⊥F1,R(x) = 0
]
= Pr [∀i, Rixl = xi]
=
l−1∏
i=1
Pr [Rixl = xi] ≤
l−1∏
i=1
2−m = 2−(l−1)m.
Note here that R1, . . . , Rl−1 are chosen independently and uniformly.
Therefore, due to Theorem 4, the lower bound given in (22) with n = 2m can be attained by the random
hash function fF1,R with l = 2. That is, the random hash function fF1,R with l = 2 has the minimum
amount of the seed randomness under the condition n = 2m.
Theorem 4 and Lemma 2 (Lemma 7) imply that the random hash function fF1,R is (t, 2m−t2 )-classical
(quantum) strong extractor.
B. Random hash function fF2,R
Next we present a hash function, fF2,R, which again requires random seed length n−m.
Definition 5: The random hash function fF2,n,m,R : Fn2 → Fm2 (sometimes simply denoted as fF2,R) is
defined as follows. Choose l = 1 + ⌈ m
n−m
⌉ and consider the finite field F2n−m . Then, we regard Fn2 as a
submodule of (F2n−m)l. We choose the uniform random seeds R to be r ∈ F2n−m . Then, fF2,r are defined
as
fF2,r : (x1, . . . , xl) 7→ (x1 + rxl, · · · , xl−1 + rl−1xl). (57)
Note that practical hash functions typically require random seed of length n or 2m. Hence, particularly
when the ratio m
n
is large, fF2,R saves the amount of random seeds very much.
The hash function fF2,R is in fact the dual of the well known universal hash function using polynomials
(see, e.g., [43]).
Lemma 11: The dual function f⊥F2,r of fF2,r satisfies
f⊥F2,r : (x1, . . . , xl) 7→ xl + rx1 + · · ·+ rl−1xl−1. (58)
For the case where the random variable R is uniformly distributed, f⊥F2,R is already shown to be almost
universal2 (see, e.g., Ref. [43], Theorem 3.5). Hence in summary, we obtain the following theorem. Here,
for the reader’s convenience, we also reproduce the proof that f⊥F2,r is almost universal2.
Theorem 5: When the random variable R is uniformly distributed, the random hash function fF2,R is
⌈ m
n−m
⌉-almost dual universal2, i.e., the random hash function f⊥F2,R is ⌈ mn−m⌉-almost universal2.
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Proof: It suffices to show that the dual function f⊥F2,R is ⌈ mn−m⌉-almost universal2. Exchanging the
roles of x and r of function f⊥F2,r given in (58), we define a new function gx(r) of r labeled by x as:
gx(r) := xl + x1r + x2r
2 · · ·+ xl−1rl−1. (59)
If x = (x1, . . . , xl) is nonzero, gx is an nonzero polynomial with degree ≤ l − 1, so there are at most
l − 1 values of r satisfying gx(r) = 0. Hence we have for x 6= 0,
Pr [fF2,R(x) = 0] = Pr [gx(R) = 0]
≤ (l − 1)max
r
PR(r) = (l − 1)2−n+m.
Theorem 5 and Lemma 2 (Lemma 7) imply that the random hash function fF2,R is a (t,
√
⌈ m
n−m
⌉2−t+m2 )-
classical (quantum) strong extractor. Therefore, comparing the hash functions fF2,R and fF1,R, we find
that the hash function fF2,R (fF1,R) realizes a better security evaluation for m/n ≤ 1/2 (m/n ≥ 1/2) in
the sense of classical (quantum) strong extractor.
Note that, unlike for conventionally δ-almost universal2 functions, a large value of δ is not a weakness
of fF2,R, which is δ-almost dual universal2 and can guarantee security.
Remark 3: Hash function fF2,R can be used for any value of compression rate 0 < α < 1 (α = m/n),
with a convention that the output is the m least significant bits of the right hand of (57) when m−n < m.
In fact it is essentially the same as fF1,R for α ≤ 1/2, and moreover, it is logically possible to present
both fF1,R and fF2,R as fF2,R alone in a unified manner. Nevertheless we introduced fF1,R in the previous
subsection because it has virtues that i) it is manifestly both universal2 and dual universal2, and ii) can
be implemented using a finite field of bit length m, which is smaller than n −m for the case of fF1,R
when α ≤ 1/2.
C. Concatenated random hash functions: fF3,R and fF4,R
By concatenating fF2,R and its dual, f⊥F2,R, we can also construct secure hash functions, gn,l,m,R, fF3,R
and fF4,R. The seed lengths of these extractors are m asymptotically.
1) Evaluations for general values of t: We first define a concatenated extractor gn,l,m,R, and give a
security evaluation valid for general value of t, the minimum entropy of the input.
Definition 6: We define a random hash function gn,l,m,R := fF2,l,m,R1 ◦ f⊥F2,n,n−l,R2 : Fn2 → Fm2 for
m < l < n. This random hash function requires 2l −m-bit uniform random seeds.
Then it follows directly from Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 that
Corollary 2: Suppose that the random variable R is given as the combination (R1, R2) of two inde-
pendent uniform random numbers R1 and R2. Then gn,l,m,R is a (t, ǫc)-classical strong extractor, and
simultaneously, a (t, ǫq)-quantum strong extractor, where
ǫc :=
√
⌈ m
n−m⌉(2
m−t + 2m−l(⌈ l
n− l⌉ − 1)), (60)
ǫq :=√
⌈ m
n−m⌉((1 + η
−2)2m−t + (1 + η)2m−l(⌈ l
n− l⌉ − 1))
+ 2η. (61)
2) Minimizing seed lengths for a fixed value of t: Next we consider a situation where the minimum
entropy t of the input is known, and adjust parameters l and η so that the seed length of gn,l,m,R is
minimized. A short calculation shows that it is minimized for l = t in the classical case, and for l = m+t
2
and η = 2m−t4 in the quantum case. Hence we define the corresponding hash functions as follows.
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Definition 7: For a given value of t, we define fF3,R := gn,t,m,R : Fn2 → Fm2 , and fF4,R := gn, t+m
2
,m,R :
F
n
2 → Fm2 .
Then by substituting l = t in (60), and l = m+t
2
, η = 2
m−t
4 in (61), we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3: Suppose that the random variable R is given as the combination (R1, R2) of two in-
dependent uniform random numbers R1 and R2. Then fF3,R is a (t, ǫ3)-classical strong extractor, and
fF4,R : F
n
2 → Fm2 is a (t, ǫ4)-quantum strong extractor, where
ǫ3 :=
√
⌈ m
n−m⌉⌈
t
n− t⌉2
m−t
2 , (62)
ǫ4 :=
2
m−t
4
√
⌈ m
n−m⌉(2
m−t
2 − 2m−t4 + (1 + 2m−t4 )⌈ m+ t
2n−m− t⌉)
+ 2
m−t
4
+1. (63)
VI. COMPARISON TO EXISTING METHODS WITH UNIFORM RANDOM SEEDS
We compare our random hash functions fF1,R, . . . , fF4,R with the existing methods of quantum (t, ǫ)-
quantum strong extractors; i.e., we derive the comparison results outlined in Section I and in Table I.
First, we compare the (modified) Toeplitz and the classical strong blenders [9] because the latter also
allows a non-uniform seed. This comparison is straightforward as follows. the result is that they require
the same min entropy t for the input to the hash function, and a larger min entropy h for the random seeds
(c.f., Table I). The rest of this section is devoted to a detailed analysis on the performances of our random
hash function, the extractors given in papers [49], [33], and the Trevisan-based extractors discussed in
[7].
A. Our random hash functions as (t, ǫ)-quantum strong extractors
We start with the characterization of our random hash functions fF1,R and fF2,R in terms of (t, ǫ)-
quantum strong extractors. As in the previous section, we assume that a user chooses one of two random
hash functions fF1,R and fF2,R depending on compression rate α = m/n being α ≤ 1/2 or α ≥ 1/2.
We will often denote them collectively by fF,R = {fF1,R, fF2,R}. Then for given values of n and m, the
relation (21) and Theorems 4 and 5 guarantee that fF,R is a (t0(n,m, ǫ), ǫ)-classical strong extractor, with
uniform random seeds of length h0(n,m, ǫ), where
t0(n,m, ǫ) = m− 2 log ǫ+ 2 log⌈ m
n−m⌉, (64)
h0(n,m, ǫ) = n−m. (65)
Note that by replacing the role of (21) by that of (37), we can show that our random hash function fF,R
is also a (t0(n,m, ǫ), ǫ)-quantum strong extractor with uniform random seeds of length h0(n,m, ǫ).
Next, for given values of n and m, the discussion in Subsection V-C guarantee that fF3,R is a (t3(n,m, ǫ), ǫ)-
classical strong extractor, with uniform random seeds of length h3(n,m, ǫ), where t3(n,m, ǫ) and h3(n,m, ǫ)
are chosen as
t3 = m− 2 log ǫ+ log⌈ m
n−m⌉ + log⌈
t3
n− t3 ⌉, (66)
h3 = 2t3 −m. (67)
Similarly, for given values of n and m, the discussion in Subsection V-C guarantee that fF4,R is a
(t4(n,m, ǫ), ǫ)-quantum strong extractor, with uniform random seeds of length h4(n,m, ǫ), where t4(n,m, ǫ)
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and h4(n,m, ǫ) are chosen as
t4 =m− 4 log ǫ
+ 4 log(
√
⌈ m
n−m
⌉(2
m−t4
2 −2
m−t4
4 +(1+2
m−t4
4 )⌈
m+t4
2n−m−t4
⌉)+2), (68)
h4 =t4 (69)
B. (t, ǫ)-quantum strong extractors of Refs. [49], [7], [33]
Next we review the performances of (t, ǫ)-quantum strong extractors discussed in papers [49], [7], [33].
The TSSR paper [49] proposed δ-almost universal random hash functions by using finite field. Eq. (27)
of [49] gives their performance as the best result for their quantum strong extractors, under the condition
that m is linear in n. We denote the random hash function of this method by fTSSR,R. When the random
seeds are uniform, it is a 1 + ǫ2m-almost universal random hash function with length
hTSSR(n,m, ǫ) := 2⌈m+ log n
m
− 2 log ǫ+ 3⌉. (70)
Due to (18) in Lemma 1, it is a (tTSSR,C(n,m, ǫ), ǫ)-classical strong extractor, where
tTSSR,C(n,m, ǫ) := m− 2 log ǫ+O(1). (71)
Similarly, due to (34) in Lemma 6, it is also a (tTSSR,Q(n,m, ǫ), ǫ)-quantum strong extractor, where
tTSSR,Q(n,m, ǫ) := m− 4 log ǫ+O(1). (72)
The paper [33] also proposed to employ an ǫ′-almost pairwise independent random hash function from
{0, 1}n to {0, 1}m, which is defined in [8, Definition 2] as a random function fR satisfying
|Pr[fR(x) = u and fR(y) = v]− 1
2m
| ≤ ǫ (73)
for any x, y ∈ {0, 1}n and u, v ∈ {0, 1}m. Hence, an ǫ′-almost pairwise independent random hash function
from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}m is a 1 + ǫ′2m-almost universal random hash function. The paper [1] proposed
the concept “an ǫ′-almost k-wise independent random string of N bits”. The paper [34] showed that the
above strings can be constructed with (2 + o(1))(log 1
ǫ′
+ log logN + k
2
+ log k) bits as the random seeds.
Then, as shown in Appendix G, we have the following lemma [39].
Lemma 12: An ǫ′-almost 2m-wise independent random string of m2n bits forms an ǫ′-almost pairwise
independent random hash function from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}m.
The calculation complexity of this method is poly(n) [15].
To guarantee the security ERd′1(fR(A)|E|PA,E) ≤ ǫ of the classical case by use of (18) in Lemma 1,
we need the following conditions:
log ǫ′ = log(ǫ22−m) +O(1), (74)
log ǫ = log 2(m−t)/2 +O(1). (75)
So, by defining
tpairwise,C(n,m, ǫ) := m− 2 log ǫ+O(1) (76)
and
hpairwise(n,m, ǫ)
:=(2 + o(1))(m− log ǫ′ + log n+ logm+ log logm)
=(1 + o(1))(4m− 4 log ǫ+ 2 logn+ 2 logm+ 1), (77)
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the above hash function is a (tpairwise,C(n,m, ǫ), ǫ)-classical strong extractor, with uniform random seeds
of length Hmin(R) = hpairwise(n,m, ǫ).
Similarly, in order to guarantee the security ERd′1(fR(A)|E|ρA,E) ≤ ǫ of the quantum case by the use
of (34) in Lemma 6, we choose η = ǫ/4 in (34). Then, we have
log ǫ′ = log(ǫ22−m) +O(1), (78)
log ǫ2 = log 2m−t − log ǫ2 +O(1), (79)
i.e.,
log ǫ =
1
4
(m− t) +O(1). (80)
Hence, by defining
tpairwise,Q(n,m, ǫ) := m− 4 log ǫ+O(1), (81)
the above hash function is a (tpairwise,Q(n,m, ǫ), ǫ)-quantum strong extractor, with uniform random seeds
of length Hmin(R) = hpairwise(n,m, ǫ).
The paper [7] proposed four quantum strong extractors based on Trevisan’s extractor, but only two of
them (Corollaries 5.2 and 5.4) fall in the category considered in this section2. In what follows, we will
concentrate on the extractor of Corollary 5.2 because it gives a better result than that of Corollary 5.4.
This hash function is a (tTrev(n,m, ǫ), ǫ)-quantum strong extractor with uniform random seeds of length
hTrev(n,m, ǫ), where
tTrev(n,m, ǫ) := m− 4 log ǫ+O(1), (82)
hTrev(n,m, ǫ) := O(log
2(
n
ǫ
) logm). (83)
C. Comparison for the case where ǫ is a constant
We further assume that ǫ is a constant and that m = αn. Then the expansion of t(n,m, ǫ), h(n,m, ǫ)
obtained above become
t0(n, αn, ǫ) = αn+O(1), (84)
h0(n, αn, ǫ) = (1− α)n, (85)
t3(n, αn, ǫ) = αn+O(1), (86)
h3(n, αn, ǫ) = αn+O(1), (87)
t4(n, αn, ǫ) = αn+O(1), (88)
h4(n, αn, ǫ) = αn+O(1), (89)
tTSSR,Q(n, αn, ǫ) = tTSSR,C(n, αn, ǫ) = αn+O(1), (90)
hTSSR(n, αn, ǫ) = 2αn+O(1), (91)
tpairwise,Q(n, αn, ǫ) = tpairwise,C(n, αn, ǫ) = αn+O(1), (92)
hpairwise(n, αn, ǫ) = 4αn+ o(n), (93)
tTrev(n, αn, ǫ) = αn+O(1), (94)
hTrev(n, αn, ǫ) = O(log
3 n). (95)
Hence, in this case, the Trevisan-based extractor of [7] requires uniform random seeds of the smaller
length hTrev, while its required min entropy tTrev of the source is in the same order as the others.
2 The paper [7] also proposes a quantum strong extractor with non-uniform random seeds in Corollary 5.5, but we exclude it in this
section because it can only be applied to the case of m sub-linear in n.
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D. Case where ǫ is exponential in nγ
We proceed to give evaluations in other regions of the required error ǫ. As is numerically shown in [53],
when ǫ is too small compared with the input length n, the evaluation based on the exponential decreasing
rate (i.e., ǫ characterized as 2−βn) gives a better bound. Here we consider a generalized setting where ǫ
and m are characterized as ǫ = 2−βnγ (γ ∈ (0, 1]) and m = αn.
In this situation, the expansion obtained in Sections VI-A and VI-B become
t0(n, αn, ǫ) = αn+ 2βn
γ +O(1), (96)
h0(n, αn, ǫ) = (1− α)n, (97)
t3(n, αn, ǫ) = αn+ 2βn
γ +O(1), (98)
h3(n, αn, ǫ) = αn+ 4βn
γ +O(1), (99)
t4(n, αn, ǫ) = αn+ 4βn
γ +O(1), (100)
h4(n, αn, ǫ) = αn+ 4βn
γ +O(1), (101)
tTSSR,Q(n, αn, ǫ) = αn+ 4βn
γ +O(1), (102)
tTSSR,C(n, αn, ǫ) = αn+ 2βn
γ +O(1), (103)
hTSSR(n, αn, ǫ) = 2αn+ 4βn
γ +O(1), (104)
tTrev(n, αn, ǫ) = αn+ 4βn
γ +O(1), (105)
hTrev(n, αn, ǫ) = O(n
2γ log n), (106)
tpairwise,Q(n, αn, ǫ) = αn+ 4βn
γ +O(1), (107)
tpairwise,C(n, αn, ǫ) = αn+ 2βn
γ +O(1), (108)
hpairwise(n, αn, ǫ) = 4αn+ 4βn
γ + o(n). (109)
As to min entropy t of the source, our quantum strong extractor requires smaller value t0, than those
obtained in other papers. Still, all quantum strong extractors require the same order of min entropy of the
source.
On the other hand, as for the required length h of uniform random seeds: When
γ >
1
2
, (110)
our extractor requires a smaller length h0 than hTrev of [7]. Also, when
α >
1
2
, (111)
h0 is smaller than hTSSR, hpairwise of [49], [33]. Additionally, when
γ = 1, 3α + 4β ≥ 1 (112)
our h0 is better than any of [7], [33], [49].
Conversely, when (110) does not hold, the extractor of [7] requires smaller h than the others. When
(110) holds and (111) or (112) does not hold, the extractor of [49] requires smaller h than the others.
E. Some optimality results
Finally, we consider the following lower bound of the required length h for the uniform random seeds,
and show that our extractor and that of [49] attain this bound in some regions.
Lemma 13: A (t, ǫ)-classical strong extractor from Fn2 to Fm2 satisfies
Hmin(R) ≥ − log ǫ− [t− n+m]+. (113)
The proof of Lemma 13 is given in Appendix F.
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For our hash function, t is given by (96), and the right hand side of (113) is βnγ− [2βnγ−n]++O(1).
When γ < 1, this quantity becomes βnγ , and has a smaller order than (97). When γ = 1, we have
α + 2β ≤ 1 because t0(n, αn, ǫ) ≤ n, and thus [2βn − n]+ = 0. The lower bound (97) is βn, which is
evaluated as βn ≤ 2βn ≤ (1 − α)n. That is, in this case, our random hash function can be realized by
the minimum order of random seeds.
Next for the extractor of [49], t is given by (102), and the right hand side of (113) is βnγ − [4βnγ −
n]++O(1). When γ < 1, it is βnγ , and has a smaller order than (104). When γ = 1, we have α+4β ≤ 1
because tTSSR,Q(n, αn, ǫ) ≤ n. Hence, [4βn− n]+ = 0. The lower bound (113) is βn, which is evaluated
as βn ≤ (2α + 4β)n. That is, in this case, the random hash function given in [49] also can be realized
by the minimum order of random seeds.
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS WITH NON-UNIFORM RANDOM SEEDS
Finally, we study the security of extractors when their random seeds are not uniform.
A. Straightforward method applicable to any extractors
First we present a straightforward method which can be applied generally to any extractor. This is
summarized as the following theorem.
Theorem 6: Assume that a random hash function fR from Fn2 to Fm2 with d-bits random seeds R is
a (t, ǫ)-classical (quantum) strong extractor, when the random seeds R is uniformly distributed over Fd2.
Then, the random hash function fR is a (t, ǫ2d−h)-classical (quantum) strong extractor when the random
seed R satisfies Hmin(R) = h.
Proof: We give a proof only for the classical case because the proof of the quantum case can be
given in the same way. Assume that a distribution PA satisfies Hmin(A) ≥ t. When R is the uniform
random number, we have
ǫ ≥ ER‖PfR(A) − PUm‖1 =
∑
r∈Fd2
2−d‖Pfr(A) − PUm‖1.
Hence, in the general case, we have
ER‖PfR(A) − PUm‖1 =
∑
r∈Fd2
PR(r)‖Pfr(A) − PUm‖1
≤
∑
r∈Fd2
2−h‖Pfr(A) − PUm‖1
=2d−h
∑
r∈Fd2
2−d‖Pfr(A) − PUm‖1 = 2d−hǫ.
In short, this theorem implies that, when the random seed R is not uniform, we have the penalty factor,
2d−h, by which ǫ is multiplied. Note here that d− h ≥ 0 holds by definition.
B. Improved bound applicable when the collision probability ERd2(fR(A)|E|PA,E‖QE) is used
In many cases, upper bounds on the security criteria ERd′1(fR(A)|E|PA,E) are obtained via those of the
averaged collision probability ERd2(fR(A)|E|PA,E‖QE); e.g., all bounds in the present paper, and some
in [12], [49]. In such a case, we can improve the penalty factor 2d−h, mentioned above, to its square root
2
d−h
2 .
This is done by applying the same argument to the collision probability ERd2(· · · ), rather than to the
security criteria ERd′1(· · · ). That is, we first prove an upper bound on the collision probability ERd2(· · · )
for the case where seed R may not be uniform.
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Theorem 7: Consider a random hash function fR from Fn2 to Fm2 with d-bit random seeds R. Let Ud
be a d-bit uniform random number. Then we have
ERd2(fR(A)|E|PA,E‖QE)
≤ 2d−hEUdd2(fUd(A)|E|PA,E‖QE) (114)
when the random seeds R satisfies Hmin(R) = h.
Proof: This theorem can be shown in the same way as Theorem 6.
Then by applying (114) to the proof of upper bound on the security criteria ERd′1(· · · ), we obtain the
improved penalty 2 d−h2 .
For example, let us change the setting of Lemma 1 in analogy with Theorem 6; that is, suppose that
fUd is a δ-almost universal2 function, but the user replaces its uniformly random seed Ud with R, which
may not be uniform, Hmin(R) = h. If we repeat the arguments of Lemma 1 for this setting, the right
hand side of (17) is multiplied by 2d−h due to (114), and as a result we obtain
ERd
′
1(fR(A)|E|PA,E) ≤ 2
d−h
2
√
δ − 1 + 2m−Hmin(A|E|PA,E), (115)
instead of (18). That is, in comparison with the straightforward method, the penalty is reduced to 2 d−h2 ,
i.e., the square root of that obtained by applying Theorem 6 to (18).
Similar arguments can also be applied to (21) of Lemma 2, (43) of Theorem 1, and (44) of Theorem 2,
and give the same penalty factor 2 d−h2 . Note here that, for Theorems 1 and 2, we start with the situation
where random seed T = (R, S) is uniformly distributed over Fd2, which is then relaxed to Hmin(R, S) = h.
It should also be noted that the proof of penalty for Theorem 2 requires a little notice. That is, although
the first term of (48) has the penalty 2 d−h2 and the second term does not, ERSd′1(hRS(X)|E|ρA,E) can be
bounded at most by the upper bound of Theorem 2 times the penalty 2 d−h2 .
As a result of this, the penalty factor for our hash functions fF1,R, . . . , fF4,R, and gn,l,m is also at most
2
d−h
2 . That is, parameters ǫc, ǫq, ǫ3, and ǫ4 of Corollaries 2 and 3 are multiplied by 2
d−h
2 , when the random
seeds are not uniform.
Further, the same discussion can be applied to the hash function given by [49] and that given in Lemma
12 because the former is evaluated via Lemma 4 and the latter is via Lemma 1.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed new random hash functions fF1,R, . . . , fF4,R using a finite field with a large size,
which are designed based on the concepts of the δ-almost dual universal2 hash function. The proposed
method realizes the two advantages simultaneously. First, it requires the smallest length of random seeds.
Second, there exist efficient algorithms for them achieving the calculation complexity of the smallest
order, namely O(n logn). Note that no previously known methods, such as the one using the modified
Toeplitz matrix, as well as those given in Refs. [7], [33], [49], can realize these two at the same time.
Although there are now several security analyses done with the δ-almost dual universality2 [18], [21],
a larger part of existing security analyses are still based on the conventional version of universality2. The
results obtained here clarify advantages of the δ-almost dual universal2 hash function over the conventional
one, and also demonstrate that they can be easily constructed in practice. We believe that these facts suggest
the importance of further security analyses based on the δ-almost dual universality2, from theoretical and
practical viewpoints.
Finally, as a typical target to which our results can be applied, let us discuss quantum key distribution
(QKD). As emphasized in Introduction and in Appendix E-C, it is now requisite for theoretical analysis
to take the finiteness of actual QKD implementations into account. One of the important consequences of
such finite size analyses is that, if one wishes to achieve the rigorous security, the input length n must be
very large (say, n ≥ 106), and thus an efficient privacy amplification algorithm with complexity O(n logn)
is necessary. While no commercial QKD product is yet known to take these analyses into account, the
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number of experimental results is increasing (see, e.g., [29]), and so it is only a matter of time until such
analysis becomes requisite for the future commercial products as well. The two advantages of our hash
functions (namely, short random seed and efficiency) will definitely help saving their implementation cost.
In fact, there remains another work for putting this saving into practice; that is, one needs to revise the
existing finite size analyses (e.g., [24], [25]), so that they conform with our new version of security bound
(e.g., bounds on ERd′1). We here note that all finite size analyses should satisfy the following crucial
condition: Both the coding rate of error reconciliation and the sacrifice bit rate of privacy amplification
should be given as explicit formulas, whose values are determined clearly and solely by the observed data
and the predetermined security level. It seems to us that (unlike papers [24], [25]) some papers on finite
size analysis do not satisfy this requirement perfectly, and instead give those functions implicitly. Such
insufficient descriptions might be an obstacle to their real applications.
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APPENDIX A
MATRIX REPRESENTATION OF RINGS
In this paper, we often consider the quotient ring R = F2[x]/g(x) with g(x) ∈ F2[x], and deg g(x) = n.
The most important example of R is Galois fields F2n , for which g(x) are irreducible.
It is easy to see that, for an arbitrary ring R, there is a representation M : R → GL(n,F2) which
satisfies, for ∀a, b ∈ R,
M(a) +M(b) = M(a + b), (116)
M(a)M(b) = M(ab). (117)
An example of M can be constructed as follows. First define a function ei : R → F2 as the ith
element of polynomial representation of a ∈ R, that is, the polynomial ∑n−1i=0 ei(a)xi is an representative
of a ∈ R = F2[x]/g(x). Then define matrix M(a) such that M(a)ij = ei(axj).
Note that the transpose M(a)T is also a matrix representation of a ∈ R, i.e., for ∀a, b ∈ R, we have
the same relation as (116), (117):
M(a)T +M(b)T = M(a + b)T , (118)
M(a)TM(b)T = M(ab)T . (119)
While (118) is obvious, (119) follows by noting that R is commutative, and that since M(a)TM(b)T =
(M(b)M(a))T = M(ba)T = M(ab)T .
APPENDIX B
RANDOM HASH FUNCTION USING THE MODIFIED TOEPLITZ MATRIX
A. Definition of random hash function fMT,R
In this section we review on a practical hash function using what we call the modified Toeplitz (MT)
matrix. We use the frame work of dual function pairs, defined in Section II, using generating matrices
G(r), and the corresponding check matrices H(r).
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Definition 8: The normal Toeplitz matrix T (r) is defined to be the one whose diagonal elements are
all same, and is parametrized by r = (r1−m, . . . , r0, . . . , rn−m−1) ∈ {0, 1}n−1 as
T (r) :=


r0 r1 · · · rn−m−1
r−1 r0 · · · rn−m−2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
r1−m r2−m · · · rn−2m

 , (120)
or T (r)ij = rj−i. The modified Toeplitz matrix is defined as GMT(r) = (T (r)|Im), with T (r) being the
normal m× (n−m) Toeplitz matrix.
Definition 9: We let fMT,R be the random hash function defined by using the modified Toeplitz matrix.
That is, the function fMT,R : F2m → F2n indexed by the random variable R = (R1−m, . . . , Rn−m−1) ∈
{0, 1}n−1 is defined as
b = fMT,r(a) := aGMT(r)
T (121)
with a ∈ {0, 1}n, b ∈ {0, 1}m.
B. (Dual) universality2
If random seed R is uniformly random, fMT,R is a (dual) universal2 hash function (see,.e.g., [51]).
Lemma 14: Random hash function fMT,R is universal2, and simultaneously dual universal2. That is,
fMT,R is a 1-almost universal2 and 1-almost dual universal2 function.
For the case where R is not necessarily uniform, by applying the argument of Section VII-B, we obtain
the following lemma.
Lemma 15: When random seed R satisfies Hmin(R) = h, fMT,R is a (t, 2
n+m−t−Hmin(R)−1
2 )-classical
(quantum) strong extractor.
APPENDIX C
FAST MULTIPLICATION ALGORITHM OF A TOEPLITZ MATRIX AND A VECTOR
We review an efficient algorithm for multiplication of a Toeplitz matrix and a vector using fast Fourier
transform (FFT) with complexity O(n logn) (see, e.g., Ref. [14], Section 4.7.7). The algorithm based on
the number theoretic transform (NTT), mentioned in Section 7.3.2 of Ref. [52], can be regarded as a
special case of this algorithm.
A. Fast multiplication algorithm of a circulant matrix and a vector
First we consider the case of circulant matrices, a special class of the Toeplitz matrices. Let v, z be
horizontal vectors of n elements, and C(v) be a square circulant matrix whose first column is v. Suppose
that one wishes to multiply C(v) and z to obtain
y = Cz. (122)
Now let F be a matrix representation of the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) of n elements: Fij = ωij ,
where ω is a primitive n-th root of one. Then by applying F from both sides, the circulant matrix C(v)
is transformed into a diagonal matrix:
FCF−1 = diag(Fv). (123)
Here diag(Fv) denotes a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements equals those of a vector Fv. By using
this relation, the multiplication Cz in (122) can be rewritten as
y = F−1diag(Fv)Fz
= F−1[Fv .∗ Fz], (124)
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where a. ∗ b denotes the Hadamard (or point-wise) product of vectors a and b, with the i-th element
(a. ∗ b)i = aibi. That is, the multiplication Cz is equivalent to (i) Fourier transforms Fv, Fz of vectors
v, z, (ii) their Hadamard product Fv. ∗ Fz, and (iii) the inverse Fourier transform F−1. All these three
calculation can be implemented with O(n logn), since the complexity of DFT is O(n logn) using FFT,
and that of the Hadamard product is O(n). Thus the total complexity of multiplication Cz turns out to
be O(n logn).
There are ways for implementing the primitive root ω. The most straightforward way is to regard
v, z ∈ {0, 1} as complex numbers in C, and let ω = exp(2πi/n) ∈ C. In this case, the final result
y ∈ {0, 1}n can be obtained by rounding off the right hand side of (124) into integers, and then by taking
remainders modulo two. The advantage of this approach is that one can implement FFT with floating
point numbers, for which there are many software library available publicly, such as FFTW [13]. As
a drawback, however, one needs to be careful about errors due to the floating point arithmetic, when n
becomes large. Another useful method for implementation is to use the number theoretic transform (NTT),
as elaborated on in Section 7.3.2 of Ref. [52]. In this case one regards v, z ∈ {0, 1} as elements in a
finite field Fp, and let ω ∈ Fp be an element with order n; i.e., ωi 6≡ 1 mod p for i = 1, . . . , n− 1 and
ωn ≡ 1 mod p. There are no errors due to floating point here because one uses integers only.
B. Fast multiplication algorithm of a Toeplitz matrix and a vector
The above method can be extended to general Toeplitz matrices. As an example, consider a multipli-
cation of a 3 × 4 Toplitz matrix and a four-element vector z = (z1, z2, z3, z4), outputting a three vector
y = (y1, y2, y3): 
y1y2
y3

 =

c d e fb c d e
a b c d




z1
z2
z3
z4

 . (125)
This can be embedded in a multiplication of a circulant matrix and a vector, by concatenating extra
elements to vectors y, z as 

y1
y2
y3
∗
∗
∗

 =


c d e f a b
b c d e f a
a b c d e f
f a b c d e
e f a b c d
d e f a b c




z1
z2
z3
z4
0
0

 . (126)
It is easy to see that the cases of y, z of arbitrary lengths (of order O(n)) can also be transformed similarly
into a calculation of a circulant matrix. As a result, a multiplication of a Toeplitz matrix and a vector can
also be implemented with complexity O(n logn).
APPENDIX D
FINITE FIELD ARITHMETIC USING CIRCULANT MATRICES
Next we present an efficient algorithm for arithmetic over large finite field F2k that is based on the
techniques of Refs. [30], [41]; we call this algorithm the field arithmetic using circulant matrices (FACM)
for the present. Then we also show that it can be used to implement our hash functions, fF1,R, . . . , fF4,R
with complexity O(n logn).
25
A. Comparison with the algorithm by [52]
The reader may already be familiar with another useful algorithm for arithmetic over a large finite field,
presented in Section 7.3.1 of Ref. [52]. Also, it is quite obvious that this algorithm and the FACM are
similarly efficient, and thus can be used to implement our hash functions efficiently. The crucial difference
of the two is that the choice of irreducible polynomial h(x); i.e., FACM uses h(x) of the form (129),
while Ref. [52] uses trinomials h(x) = xl + xs + 1. The relation can be summarized as follows.
• As the typical case, Ref. [52] proposed to use a Mersenne exponent as the integer l, whose possible
degrees are listed in [52, p. 108]. When the method in [52] is limited to the case with a Mersenne
exponent, the method by the FACM has can be used for a larger number of degrees, at least, in a
practical range due to the numerical list of possible degrees in (127).
• The method given in Ref. [52] cannot be restricted to the above case. For example, x2n + xn + 1
is irreducible iff n = 3k for some integer k, and x4n + xn + 1 is irreducible iff n = 3k5m for some
integers k and m [55]. When we take into account such general cases, it is not easy to compare which
method can be applied to a larger number of degrees because it is not easy to list all of possible
degrees in this method even in a practical range.
Overall, we can summarize that the two algorithms are explicitly different, and are applicable to different
sizes k of the finite field. Hence, we present the FACM below. In practice, by using these two algorithms
in a complementary way one becomes able to handle a wider class of finite fields; i.e., even when one
algorithm does not suit the size of the hash function actually used, the other may still be applicable. As
a result, the two algorithms are valid for different sizes k of finite fields F2k .
B. Restriction on the size of the field
Throughout this section, we consider finite fields F2k whose k satisfies the following two conditions:
(i) k + 1 is an odd prime.
(ii) 2 is a primitive root modulo k + 1.
Definition 10: We denote subset of natural number N satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) by NA.
Condition (ii) means that 2i mod k + 1 for i = 1, . . . , k exhaust all non-zero element mod k + 1. For
example, 4 ∈ NA since {2i mod 5 | 0 ≤ i ≤ 3} = {1, 2, 4, 3 mod 5} = {1, 2, 3, 4 mod 5}; while 6 6∈ NA
since {2i mod 7 | 0 ≤ i ≤ 5} = {1, 2, 4 mod 7}.
It has been conjectured by Artin that there are infinitely many elements k ∈ NA (see, e.g., Ref. [42,
Chap. 21]). In order to demonstrate that they are distributed densely enough, we list the smallest integer
k ∈ NA satisfying k ≥ 10i for each i = 1, ..., 12:
NA ∋ 10, 100,
103 + 18, 104 + 36,
105 + 2, 106 + 2,
107 + 138, 108 + 36,
109 + 20, 1010 + 18,
1011 + 2. 1012 + 90.
(127)
These k ∈ NA are obtained quite efficiently by using the algorithm that we present in Subsection D-G.
Indeed, each element was found in less than a second by using Mathematica on a usual personal computer.
C. Expressing F2k using circulant matrices
In this subsection, we show that arithmetic (i.e., addition and multiplication) over F2k with k ∈ NA is
isomorphic to that of (k + 1)× (k + 1) circulant matrices.
Theorem 8: Given k ∈ NA, let S be the subset of F2[x] with degree ≤ k and even Hamming weight:
S :=
{
k∑
i=0
fkx
k :
k∑
i=0
fi ≡ 0 mod 2
}
. (128)
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Then there is a one-to-one correspondence between S and F2k . Furthermore, arithmetic of S modulo
xk+1 + 1 is isomorphic to F2k .
Now recall, from the theory of cyclic codes, that the arithmetic of polynomials modulo xk+1 + 1 is
isomorphic to that of circulant matrices (see, e.g., [27]). Hence the above theorem claims that arithmetic
over F2k , k ∈ NA can be done by using circulant matrices.
The proof of Theorem 8 follows directly from the following two lemmas:
Lemma 16: Let
h(x) := (xk+1 + 1)/(x+ 1) = xk + · · ·+ x+ 1. (129)
Then
• x+ 1 and h(x) are coprime, if k + 1 is odd.
• h(x) is irreducible, if and only if k + 1 is a prime and 2 is a primitive root modulo k + 1.
Proof: The first item is trivial. The ‘if’ part of the second item can be shown as follows. Let α be one
of the roots of h(x) = 0, and let j(x) ∈ F2[x] be the minimal polynomial of α. Then j(x) divides h(x).
Also let βi := a2
i
, then we have j(βi) = 0 for ∀i ∈ Z, since j(α2i) = j(α2i−1)2 = · · · = j(α)2i = 0. By
noting that α is a k+1-th root of one, and that 2 is a primitive root mod k+1, we see that β0, . . . , βk−1
are all distinct, and thus deg j(x) ≥ k = deg h(x). Hence h(x) must equal j(x), which is irreducible.
The ‘only if’ part of the second item can also be shown similarly.
Lemma 17: For k ∈ NA,
• The ring F2[x]/(xk+1 + 1) is isomorphic to F2[x]/(x+ 1)× F2[x]/h(x) ∼= F2 × F2k .
• S ⊂ F2[x] is closed under addition and multiplication modulo xk+1 + 1; it is in fact isomorphic to
F2k .
Proof: Since k ≥ 2 for k ∈ NA, deg h(x) ≥ 2. Then due to Lemma 16, h(x) and x+1 are coprime.
Hence the first item follows directly from the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT). For the second item, first
note that polynomials {f(x) ∈ F2[x] | deg f ≤ k} form representatives of F2[x]/(xk+1 + 1). Restricting
f(x)’s weight to be even is equivalent to requiring (x + 1)|f(x), or equivalently, f(x) ≡ 0 mod x + 1,
which is preserved under addition and multiplication. Hence S form representatives of F2[x]/h(x) ∼= F2k .
D. Field arithmetic using circulant matrices (FACM)
Here we present explicit algorithms for addition and multiplication over F2k . By applying the result of
the previous subsection, we represent arithmetic over F2k as that of circulant matrices and vectors, which
can be preformed with complexity O(k log k) (see Appendix C). In the rest of this paper, we will call
this algorithm the field arithmetic using circulant matrices (FACM) algorithm for short.
a) Data format: Following Theorem 8, we will represent an element of F2k by a polynomial a(x) ∈ S
defined modulo xk+1 + 1
a(x) =
k∑
i=0
aix
k,
whose Hamming weight is zero:
∑k
i=0 ak = 0 mod 2. It is often convenient to use the shortened form
D(a) = (a0, . . . , ak−1), where D is a map D : {0, 1}k+1 → {0, 1}k defined by
D : a = (a0, . . . , ak) 7→ a′ = (a0, . . . , ak−1).
There are some merits for using shortened forms D(a). One is that it gives a one-to-one correspondence
with elements of a ∈ F2k and k-bit strings. Indeed there exists an inverse map, or an extension map
E : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}k+1 defined by
E : a′ = (a0, . . . , ak−1) 7→ a = (a0, . . . , ak−1, ak),
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where ak is the parity of the shortened form a′
ak =
k−1∑
i=0
ai mod 2.
An additional merit is that it can be used to save memory. Hence in what follows, we will make it a rule
to store D(a), once a set of calculations using a is finished.
By using this format, the summation and multiplication algorithms of elements a, b ∈ F2k can be given
as follows.
b) Addition: Addition is a bitwise exclusive OR a⊕ b.
c) Multiplication: It can be done as follows:
• (Step 1) Define a (k + 1)× (k + 1) circulant matrix C(a) by C(a)ij = aj−i mod k+1, or
C(a) :=


a0 a1 · · · ak
ak a0 · · · ak−1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
a1 a2 · · · a0

 . (130)
• (Step 2) Calculate and output c = C(a)bT .
Note here that the multiplication C(a)bT of the second step can be carried out with complexity O(k log k)
by using the FFT or NTT algorithm (see Appendix C).
E. Calculating fF1,R using circulant matrices
By using the FACM algorithm defined above, random hash function fF1,R, introduced in the previous
section, can be implemented efficiently with complexity O(n logn).
1) Restriction on output length m: In order to apply the FACM algorithm, the output length m must
satisfy conditions (i) and (ii), i.e., m ∈ NA. By construction of fF1,R, the input length must be its multiple,
i.e., n = lm with l ∈ Z, l > 1. Also by construction of fF1,R, the random variable R must be lm bits:
R = (R1, . . . , Rl), where Ri = ri ∈ {0, 1}p.
2) Algorithm: For the input string x and the random string R,
• Inputs: The input string (x1, . . . , xl) and the random number (R1, . . . , Rl−1), where each xi, Ri ∈
{0, 1}k represents elements in F2k .
• (Step 1) Let y = E(x1).
• (Step 2) For i = 2 to l, calculate y = y + C(E(Ri))E(xi)T using the FACM.
• (Step 3) Output D(y).
F. Calculating fF2,R using circulant matrices
Similarly, random hash function fF2,R can also be implemented efficiently with complexity O(n logn).
1) Restriction on length n−m: In order to apply the FACM algorithm, the length n−m must satisfy
conditions (i) and (ii), i.e., k := n−m ∈ NA. By construction of fF2,R, the input and output lengths must
be its multiple: i.e., n = lk and m = (l − 1)k for some l ∈ Z, l > 1.
2) Algorithm:
• Inputs: the input string (x1, . . . , xl) and the random number R, where each xi, R ∈ {0, 1}k represents
elements in F2k .
• (Step 1) Let yl = E(xl), s = E(R).
• (Step 2) For i = 2 to l, calculate yi = E(xi) + C(s)yTl , and s = C(E(R))sT using the FACM.
• (Step 3) Output (D(y1), . . . , D(yl−1)).
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G. An algorithm for finding large k ∈ NA
Here we present methods to find an integer k ∈ NA, i.e., integers k satisfying conditions (i) and (ii). As
already mentioned, the existence of arbitrarily large k is guaranteed by Artin’s conjecture, but finding a
number k ∈ NA of a desired size is another problem. For applications of hash functions, it is often useful
to let k large: E.g., for the case of quantum key distribution (QKD), in order to achieve unconditional
security with the finite size effect considered, one usually needs to perform privacy amplification with
input length ≃ 109, for which k ≃ 109 (see, e.g., [25]).
A straightforward method for finding k ∈ NA is to generate a prime k + 1, and then to verify that
2i mod k+1 are all different for i = 1, . . . , k. In fact, there is a better method if integer k can be factored.
Note the following lemma:
Lemma 18: Suppose k + 1 is a prime and k is factored as k = pe11 · · · pess , where pi are distinct primes
and ei ∈ N. Then condition (ii) holds if and only if
1 ≤ ∀i ≤ s, 2k/pi 6≡ 1 mod k + 1. (131)
Proof: Since the order of the multiplicative group F×k+1 is k, and due to Lagrange’s theorem, the
order o(2) of 2 ∈ F×k+1 is a divisor of k. Eq. (131) guarantees that o(2) does not divide k/pi for all i.
Hence we have o(2) = k.
Hence, k ∈ NA can be found by the following method:
• (Step 1) Select an even integer k ≥ 2 (incrementally or randomly).
• (Step 2) Perform a primality test on k + 1. If k + 1 is not a prime, go back to step 1. (For efficient
primality test algorithms, see e.g., Ref, [40], Section 3.4.)
• (Step 3) Factor k as k = pe11 · · · pess , where pi are distinct primes and ei ∈ N. (For efficient integer
factoring algorithms, see e.g., Ref, [40], Chapter 15.)3
• (Step 4) Verify condition (131), i.e.,
1 ≤ ∀i ≤ s, 2k/pi 6≡ 1 mod k + 1.
If this does not hold, go back to step 1.
• (Step 5) Return k.
An element k ∈ NA, k ≤ 1050 can be found in less than a second, by using this algorithm implemented
with Mathematica on a usual personal computer. The examples in (127) were also found by this algorithm
(we chose k incrementally in Step 1 in this case).
APPENDIX E
NOTES ON IMPLEMENTATION EFFICIENCY
A. Performances of fMT,R and Trevisan’s extractor
The random hash function fMT,R using the modified Toeplitz matrix has the merit that it can be
implemented efficiently. For multiplication of a Toeplitz matrix and a vector, there is an efficient exploiting
the fast Fourier transform (FFT) algorithm (see Appendix C or Ref. [14]). The complexity of this algorithm
scales as O(n logn), or O(logn) per bit, which can be regarded as a constant in practice. The throughput
of an actual implementation exceeds 1Mbps for key length 106 on software, as demonstrated, e.g., in
Ref. [2]. More recently, one of the authors verified that a throughput around 10 Mbps can be realized
for key lengths up to 108, using a typical personal computer equipped with a 64-bit CPU (Intel Core i7)
with 16 GByte memory, and using a publicly available software library for FFT, called FFTW [13]. As
a comparison, note that the typical throughput of Trevisan’s extractor is less than a thousandth (i.e., 10
kbps) in these regions, as demonstrated in Ref. [32].
3 Note here that, unlike in the case of public key cryptography, factoring of k is practical. This is because we are factoring an integer of
length log k, with k being the data length. This is in contrast with the situation of breaking a public key cryptography, where one needs to
factor integer of length k.
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B. Performances of fF1,R, fF2,R, fF3,R, and fF4,R
The algorithms for fF1,R, fF2,R presented in Appendix D-D are similarly efficient. The algorithm for
fF1,R (respectively, fF2,R) essentially repeats the calculation of the modified Toeplitz matrix fMT,R l times
with a small block length m (respectively, k), such that the total bit length processed equals the input
length n = lm (respectively, n = lk). Hence, even in comparison of actual implementations, one can
expect it to be faster than the modified Toeplitz fMT,R (and of course than the normal Toeplitz) with the
same input length n. Further, it follows that it is faster than Trevisan’s hash function with the same n,
which is usually much slower than fMT,R, as we have seen in Appendix E-A.
By using the same reasoning, f⊥F2,R, the dual function of fF2,R, is also expected to be faster than fMT,R,
and than Trevisan’s extractor. Hence one can also expect that fF3,R and fF4,R, consisting f⊥F2,R and fF1,R
or fF2,R, achieves more than half throughput of fMT,R, and of Trevisan’s extractor.
C. Importance of efficient algorithm with complexity O(n logn) for quantum key distribution
As emphasized in Introduction, the main goal of this paper is to propose new privacy amplification
schemes, so that the requirements on the random seed are relaxed. It is easy to see that such improvements
are meaningless in practice, unless there are efficient algorithms corresponding to them. Here we point
out further that, if one uses privacy amplification schemes for quantum key distribution (QKD), the usual
notion of efficiency (i.e., with polynomial complexity) is not sufficient. Rather, we should restrict ourselves
to algorithms with complexity O(n logn), e.g., the modified Toeplitz matrix fMT,R or fF1,R, fF2,R, fF3,R,
and fF4,R, which proposed in this paper. This is because of the finite size effect, as explained below.
In the early days of QKD research, almost all papers were only concerned with the security in the
asymptotic limit, where the input length n of the hash function goes to infinity (see, e.g., [36] and
references therein). Recently, however, it has become requisite for theoretical analysis to take the finiteness
of actual QKD implementations into account, and as a result of that, the researcher conclude that, if one
wishes to achieve the rigorous security, the input length n must at least satisfy n ≥ 106 [24], [25], [48].
In this region, algorithms that are efficient in the usual sense are useless, as one can easily see from
the following example: Consider a case where one performs a privacy amplification of n = 107, using
a straightforward matrix multiplication algorithm of complexity O(n2). Then even under an optimistic
assumption that a normal CPU of 3GHz clock rate can process 100 bits per cycle, the throughput of the
final key will be around 30kbps, which is far below the typical throughput ≥ 300 kbps realized in current
QKD systems (e.g., [38]).
D. Performance of a scheme proposed in Dodis et al. [9]
Note that Dodis et al. [9] proposed a (t, 2n+m−t−Hmin(R)−r+22 )-classical strong extractor with the name
“strong blender”, where r is an integer greater than 1. Their strong extractor has almost same performance
for the classical case as the random hash function using the Toeplitz matrix. However, their scheme uses
m multiplications of n×n matrices, whose computation typically takes O(n3) time. It may be possible to
reduce it to O(n2) by using fast multiplication techniques of finite fields such as the optimal normal basis,
but it requires a heavy pre-computation as a drawback. In any case, an efficient algorithm of O(n logn)
is very unlikely for their scheme.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 13
First, we fix an arbitrary hash function fr with r ∈ R. Then, there exist 2n−m elements a1, . . . , a2n−m
such that their images of fr are the same. Assume that t− n +m ≥ 0. We consider the distribution PA
on A = Fn2 such that PA(ai) = 2−t for i = 1, . . . , 2n−m and other probabilities are less than 2−t. This
distribution satisfies Hmin(A) ≥ t. Then, we have∑
b
[Pfr(A)(b)− PUn(b)]+ ≥ (2−(t−n+m) − 2−m), (132)
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which implies
‖Pfr(A) − PUn‖1 ≥ 2(2−(t−n+m) − 2−m). (133)
Inequality (15) yields that
Pr[R = r] · 2(2−(t−n+m) − 2−m) ≤ ǫ. (134)
Since t < n, we have
2−(t−n+m)Pr[R = r] ≤ ǫ. (135)
which implies
− log Pr[R = r] ≥ − log ǫ− [t− n+m]+. (136)
Since the above inequality holds for an arbitrary r, we obtain (113).
Next, we consider the case when t − n + m < 0. We choose a distribution PA satisfying that∑2n−m
i=1 PA(ai) = 1 and Hmin(A) ≥ t. Then, we obtain∑
b
[Pfr(A)(b)− PUn(b)]+ ≥ (2−[t−n+m]+ − 2−m). (137)
Using the same discussion, we obtain
− log Pr[R = r] ≥ − log ǫ− [t− n+m]+. (138)
Since the above inequality holds for an arbitrary r ∈ R, we obtain (113).
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF LEMMA 12
We recall the definition of an ǫ′-almost k-wise independent random string F of N bits [1], [34]. A
random random string F of N bits is called an ǫ′-almost k-wise independent random string when for any
k positions i1 < i2 < · · · < ik and any k-bit string α, we have
|Pr[xi1xi2 · · ·xik = α]− 2−k| ≤ ǫ. (139)
Now, we consider the correspondence between m2n-bit strings (elements of {0, 1}m2n) and functions
from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}m as follows. For a given function f from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}m, we define an m2n-bit
string as ⊕x∈{0,1}nf(x) ∈ {0, 1}m2n = ({0, 1}m)2n .
Assume that F is an ǫ′-almost k-wise independent random string of m2n bits. Using the above
correspondence, from F , we define a random hash function fR from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}m. Due to the
condition (139), we find that the random hash function fR satisfies (73).
APPENDIX H
PROOFS OF LEMMAS 1 AND 4
First, we show the classical case, i.e., Lemma 1 For a fixed hash function fr, we have
d2(fr(A)|E|PA,E‖QE)
=2−H2(fr(A)|E|PA,E‖QE) − 2D2(PE‖QE)−m
=
∑
a
∑
a′∈f−1r (fr(a))
∑
e
PA,E(a
′, e)PA,E(a, e)QE(e)
−1
− 2D2(ρE‖σE)−m.
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Since the probability a′ ∈ f−1R (fR(a)) is less than δ2−m for a′ 6= a, we have
ERd2(fR(A)|E|PA,E‖QE)
≤δ2−m
∑
a′ 6=a
∑
e
PA,E(a
′, e)PA,E(a, e)QE(e)
−1
+
∑
a
∑
e
PA,E(a, e)
2QE(e)
−1 − 2D2(PE‖QE)−m
=δ2−m
∑
a′,a
∑
e
PA,E(a
′, e)PA,E(a, e)QE(e)
−1
+ (1− δ2−m)
∑
a
∑
e
PA,E(a, e)
2QE(e)
−1 − 2D2(PE‖QE)−m
=(δ − 1)2D2(PE‖QE)−m + (1− δ2−m)2−H2(A|E|PA,E‖QE)
≤(δ − 1)2D2(PE‖QE)−m + 2−H2(A|E|PA,E‖QE).
Next, we show the quantum case, i.e., Lemma 4 For a fixed hash function fr, we have
d2(fr(A)|E|ρA,E‖σE)
=2−H2(fr(A)|E|ρA,E‖σE) − 2D2(ρE‖σE)−m
=
∑
a
∑
a′∈f−1r (fr(a))
Tr σ
− 1
2
E ρa′,Eσ
− 1
2
E ρa,E − 2D2(ρE‖σE)−m.
Since the probability a′ ∈ f−1R (fR(a)) is less than δ2−m for a′ 6= a, we have
ERd2(fR(A)|E|ρA,E‖σE)
≤δ2−m
∑
a′ 6=a
Tr σ
− 1
2
E ρa′,Eσ
− 1
2
E ρa,E
+
∑
a
Tr σ
− 1
2
E ρa,Eσ
− 1
2
E ρa,E − 2D2(ρE‖σE)−m
=δ2−m
∑
a′,a
Trσ
− 1
2
E ρa′,Eσ
− 1
2
E ρa,E
+ (1− δ2−m)
∑
a
Tr σ
− 1
2
E ρa,Eσ
− 1
2
E ρa,E − 2D2(ρE‖σE)−m
=(δ − 1)2D2(ρE‖σE)−m + (1− δ2−m)2−H2(A|E|ρA,E‖σE)
≤(δ − 1)2D2(ρE‖σE)−m + 2−H2(A|E|ρA,E‖σE)
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